Method for Running Dynamic Systems over Encrypted Data for Infinite Time Horizon without Bootstrapping and Re-encryption

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
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# Advantage of Encrypted control



- control operation directly over encrypted data
- protection of data even when the computation is performed
- operation without decryption key  $\implies$  enhanced security

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Kogiso & Fujita, CDC, 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Schulze Darup, Alexandru, Quevedo, & Pappas, Control Systems Magazine, 2021

It can be implemented with Homomorphic Encryption (HE).

Properties for  $(+, \times)$ :

 $c_1 = \operatorname{Enc}(m_1) + c \operatorname{Enc}(m_2) \qquad \longrightarrow \qquad \begin{array}{c} \operatorname{Dec}(c_1) = m_1 + m_2 \\ c_2 = \operatorname{Enc}(m_1) \times c \operatorname{Enc}(m_2) \end{array} \rightarrow \qquad \begin{array}{c} \operatorname{Dec}(c_2) = m_1 \times m_2 \\ \operatorname{Dec}(c_2) = m_1 \times m_2 \end{array}$ 

 $+_c, \times_c$ : operation over encrypted data,

Enc: encryption, Dec: decryption

▶ In theory<sup>1</sup>, "bootstrapping of fully HE" enables any sort of operation.

 For real-time control, the properties for (+, ×) have been exploited. (because of computational complexity of bootstrapping)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Gentry, ACM STOC, 2009

# Issue when implementing dynamic systems using HE

e.g.,  


$$x(t+1) = -0.25 \times x(t) + 1$$
  
 $x(0) = 1$ 
 $x(1) = 0.75$   
 $x(2) = 0.8125$   
 $x(3) = 0.796875$   
 $x(4) = 0.80078125$ 

(# of the decimal digits of x(t) increases, despite that |x(t)| is bounded.)

- ▶ The state is recursively multiplied by non-integer numbers, in general.
- Rounding operation is needed periodically to discard Least Significant Bits (LSB), but it is not yet possible for HE, unless the bootstrapping is used.

#### Incapability of operating for infinite time horizon

# Re-encryption has been used for functions other than $(+,\times)$ .



#### e.g.,

projection for MPC (as in [Schulze Darup, IFAC WC, 2020])

division/inversion for data driven control [Alexandru, Tsiamis, & Pappas, CDC, 2020]

maximum operation for RL [Suh & Tanaka, ACC, 2021]

methods based on Multi-Party Computation, assuming "non-colluding models"

for discarding LSB in linear systems:

- state re-encryption (as in [Teranishi & Kogiso, CDC, 2020])
- (exception) reset to initial value [Murguia, Farokhi, & Shames, TAC, 2020]
- output re-encryption [Kim, Shim, & Han, CDC, 2020]

However, without the presence of the decryption key, the system cannot continue the operation by itself.

# Problem of interest

$$\begin{split} x(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n: \text{state,} \\ u(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n: \text{input,} \\ y(t) \in \mathbb{R}^p: \text{output,} \\ x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n: \text{initial state,} \\ \{A, B, C, D\}: \text{real matrices,} \end{split}$$

Given a dynamic system over  $\mathbb{R}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} x(t+1) &= Ax(t) + Bu(t), \quad x(0) = x_0, \\ y(t) &= Cx(t) + Du(t), \\ (x(t), u(t), y(t): \text{ bounded}) \end{aligned}$$

the problem is to construct a system over encrypted data, such that

- it can operate without re-encryption and bootstrapping,
- it can run for an infinite time horizon, with equivalent performance.

# Problem of interest

$$\begin{split} x(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n: \text{state,} \\ u(t) \in \mathbb{R}^m: \text{input,} \\ y(t) \in \mathbb{R}^p: \text{output,} \\ x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n: \text{initial state,} \\ \{A, B, C, D\}: \text{ real matrices,} \end{split}$$

Given a dynamic system over  $\mathbb{R}$ ,

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the problem is to convert  $(\spadesuit)$  to a system over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , which

- operates only with  $(+, \times)$ , without discarding LSB
- can recover  $\{y(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  from the output, with a static function.

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### Advantage of state matrix as integers

conversion when  $A \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$ :

$$\overline{x}(t+1) = A \,\overline{x}(t) + \left\lceil \frac{B}{\mathsf{s}} \right\rfloor \cdot \left\lceil \frac{u(t)}{\mathsf{r}} \right\rfloor$$
$$\overline{y}(t) = \left\lceil \frac{C}{\mathsf{s}} \right\rfloor \cdot \overline{x}(t) + \left\lceil \frac{D}{\mathsf{s}^2} \right\rfloor \cdot \left\lceil \frac{u(t)}{\mathsf{r}} \right\rfloor$$
$$\overline{x}(0) = \left\lceil \frac{x_0}{\mathsf{rs}} \right\rfloor \qquad (\clubsuit)$$

given system w/ perturbation:

$$\begin{aligned} x(t+1) &= Ax(t) + Bu(t) + e_x(t) \\ \Leftrightarrow \qquad y(t) &= Cx(t) + Du(t) + e_y(t) \\ x(0) &= x_0 + e_0 \end{aligned}$$

 $\label{eq:r} \begin{array}{l} \mathsf{r}>0: \text{quantization step size}\\ 1/\mathsf{s}\geq 1: \text{scale factor}\\ e_x(t), e_y(t), e_0: \text{quantization error} \end{array}$ 

### Observation

• If 
$$A \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$$
, then ( $\clubsuit$ ) operates over  $(\mathbb{Z}, +, \times)$ , with  $\begin{array}{c} x(t) \equiv \operatorname{rs} \cdot \overline{x}(t) \\ y(t) \equiv \operatorname{rs}^2 \cdot \overline{y}(t) \end{array}$   
(without discarding LSB)  
( $e_y(t) \\ e_0 \end{array}$ )  $\rightarrow 0$  as  $r \rightarrow 0$  and  $s \rightarrow 0$ .

<sup>1</sup>Cheon, Han, Kim, Kim, & Shim, CDC, 2018

### So, we propose conversion of state matrix to integers.

given system:  $x(t+1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + e_x(t)$ (w/ perturbation) y(t) = Cx(t) + Du(t)

$$(A \not\in \mathbb{Z}^{\mathsf{n} \times \mathsf{n}})$$

#### Theorem

For any  $\delta > 0$ ,  $\exists e_x(t)$  s.t.  $||e_x(t)|| \le \delta$  and  $\exists$  periodically time varying system

$$\begin{aligned} \xi(t+1) &= F_{\sigma}\xi(t) + G_{\sigma}u(t), \quad \sigma = t \mod k, \quad k \in \mathbb{N} \\ y_{\xi}(t) &= H_{\sigma}\xi(t) + Du(t), \quad \text{with } F_{\sigma} \in \mathbb{Z}^{l \times l}, \quad l \in \mathbb{N} \end{aligned}$$

s.t. 
$$\begin{array}{l} x(t) \equiv T_{\sigma}\xi(t) \\ y(t) \equiv y_{\xi}(t) \end{array} \text{ with some } \{T_{\sigma}\}_{\sigma=0}^{k-1}. \end{array}$$

 $F_{\sigma} \in \mathbb{Z}^{l \times l} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{operation over } (\mathbb{Z}, +, \times) \\ \text{w/o discarding LSB} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{encrypted system} \\ \text{w/o re-encryption} \end{array}$ 

### Sketch of proof Method for the conversion

Decomposition into stable/unstable part:

$$\begin{aligned} x(t+1) &= Ax(t) + Bu(t) \\ y(t) &= Cx(t) + Du(t) \end{aligned} \Leftrightarrow \begin{aligned} z_s(t+1) &= A_s z_s(t) + B_s u(t) \\ z_u(t+1) &= A_u z_u(t) + B_u u(t) \\ y(t) &= C_s z_s(t) + C_u z_u(t) + Du(t) \end{aligned}$$

 $\begin{array}{l} A_s \text{: Schur stable; eigenvalue } \lambda \in \mathbb{C} \text{ of } A_s \text{ is s.t. } |\lambda| < 1 \\ A_u \text{: anti-stable; eigenvalue } \lambda \in \mathbb{C} \text{ of } A_u \text{ is s.t. } |\lambda| \geq 1 \end{array}$ 

1. unstable part ightarrow approximation of eigenvalues to algebraic integers

2. stable part  $\rightarrow$  Finite Impulse Response (FIR) approximation

# 1. Conversion for the unstable part

Approximation of eigenvalues to algebraic integers

Idea: for each eigenvalue  $|\lambda| \ge 1$ , choose  $a \approx \lambda$  s.t.  $a^k \in \mathbb{Z}$  with some  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ 

e.g., 
$$z(t+1) = 2.37z(t) + u(t)$$
  
 $y(t) = z(t)$ 

$$\Rightarrow \qquad \tilde{z}(t+1) = a\tilde{z}(t) + u(t)$$
 $\tilde{y}(t) = \tilde{z}(t)$ 

Let a := <sup>5</sup>√[(2.37)<sup>5</sup>] = 2.3714... so that a<sup>5</sup> = [(2.37)<sup>5</sup>] ∈ Z.
conversion: (In general, a = <sup>k</sup>√[λ<sup>k</sup>] → λ as k↑)

$$\begin{split} \xi(t) &:= a^{-(t \mod 5)} \tilde{z}(t) \\ \downarrow \\ \xi(t+1) &= \begin{cases} \xi(t) + a^{-(t+1 \mod 5)} u(t), & \text{ if } t \mod 5 = 0, 1, 2, 3, \\ a^5 \xi(t) + u(t), & \text{ if } t \mod 5 = 4, \\ \tilde{y}(t) &= a^{(t \mod 5)} \xi(t) \end{split}$$

(perturbation + time-varying transformation  $\rightarrow$  state matrix as integers)

#### For the general case, for the unstable part:

#### Lemma

For any  $\delta > 0$  and anti-stable  $A_u \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ , there exists  $\tilde{A}_u \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ 

s.t. 
$$\|A_u - \tilde{A}_u\| \le \delta$$
 and  $T \tilde{A}_u^k T^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$ ,

with some  $T \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ .

conversion:

$$z(t+1) = A_u z(t) + B_u u(t) \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad \tilde{z}(t+1) = \tilde{A}_u \tilde{z}(t) + B_u u(t)$$
$$y(t) = C_u z(t) \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad \tilde{y}(t) = C_u \tilde{z}(t)$$
$$\downarrow \quad \xi(t) := T \tilde{A}_u^{-(t \mod k)} \tilde{z}(t)$$

$$\xi(t+1) = \begin{cases} \xi(t) + T\tilde{A}_u^{-(t+1 \mod k)} B_u u(t), & \text{if } t \mod k = 0, \cdots, k-2, \\ T\tilde{A}_u^k u^{-1} \xi(t) + TB_u u(t), & \text{if } t \mod k = k-1, \\ \tilde{y}(t) = C_u \tilde{A}_u^{(t \mod k)} T^{-1} \xi(t) \end{cases}$$

(perturbation + time-varying transformation  $\rightarrow$  state matrix as integers)

### 2. Conversion for the stable part

Finite Impulse Response (FIR) approximation for the stable part:

$$z_s(t+1) = A_s z_s(t) + B_s u(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{n_s}$$
$$y_s(t) = C_s z_s(t)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \tilde{z}_{s,1}(t+1) \\ \tilde{z}_{s,2}(t+1) \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{z}_{s,k}(t+1) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & I_{n_s} & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & I_{n_s} \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{z}_{s,1}(t) \\ \tilde{z}_{s,2}(t) \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{z}_{s,k}(t) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} B_s \\ A_s B_s \\ \vdots \\ A_s^{k-1} B_s \end{bmatrix} u(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{kn_s}$$

$$\tilde{y}_s(t) = C_s \tilde{z}_{s,1}(t)$$

► FIR ⇒ state matrix as integers ►  $A_s$  is Schur stable ⇒  $\left\| \begin{bmatrix} z_s(t) - \tilde{z}_{s,1}(t) \\ y_s(t) - \tilde{y}_s(t) \end{bmatrix} \right\| \to 0$  as  $k \uparrow$ .

# Main result

proposed implementation over  $(\mathbb{Z}, +, \times)$ , with  $F_{\sigma}$  as integers:

where 
$$\begin{bmatrix} e_x(t) \\ e_y(t) \\ e_0 \end{bmatrix} : \text{(approximation error)} + \text{(quantization error)}, \quad \text{so that} \quad \begin{array}{l} x(t) \equiv \mathsf{rs} \cdot T_\sigma \bar{\xi}(t) \\ y(t) \equiv \mathsf{rs}^2 \cdot \bar{y}(t) \end{array}$$

#### Theorem

▶ It can operate using HE without re-encryption, for inf. time horizon.

$$\blacktriangleright \left\| \begin{bmatrix} e_x(t) \\ e_y(t) \\ e_0 \end{bmatrix} \right\| \to 0 \quad \text{as} \quad \mathsf{r} \to 0, \ \mathsf{s} \to 0, \ \mathsf{and} \ k \to \infty.$$

Assuming that the (closed-loop) system is stable w.r.t. {e<sub>x</sub>(t), e<sub>y</sub>(t), e<sub>0</sub>}, the performance is guaranteed.

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Method for encrypting both signals and matrices

Any additively HE can be applied, with encrypting  $\{x(t), u(t), y(t)\}$  only.

▶ To encrypt  $\{F_{\sigma}, G_{\sigma}, H_{\sigma}, D\}$  as well, the method of [1] can be used.

• use of "GSW" scheme for recursive multiplication of  $Enc(F_{\sigma})$ :

$$\mathbf{x}^+ = \mathsf{Enc}(F_{\sigma}) \times_c \mathbf{x} \quad \to \quad \mathsf{Dec}(\mathbf{x}^+) = F_{\sigma} \cdot \mathsf{Dec}(\mathbf{x}) + \Delta$$
(x: encrypted state)

• Unlike most other schemes, it allows  $\times_c$  infinite number of times, where the error growth  $\Delta$  can be controlled.

<sup>1</sup>Kim, Shim, & Han, under review for TAC, arXiv:1912.07362


# Method for choosing the size of message space

Technically, the encrypted system operates over  $\mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, 1, 2, \cdots, q-1\}$ :

$$\begin{split} \overline{\xi}(t+1) &= F_{\sigma}\overline{\xi}(t) + \left\lceil \frac{G_{\sigma}}{\mathsf{s}} \right\rfloor \left\lceil \frac{u(t)}{\mathsf{r}} \right\rfloor \mod q, \qquad \overline{\xi}(0) = \left\lceil \frac{\xi_{0}}{\mathsf{rs}} \right\rfloor \mod q, \\ \overline{y}(t) &= \left\lceil \frac{H_{\sigma}}{\mathsf{s}} \right\rfloor \overline{\xi}(t) + \left\lceil \frac{D}{\mathsf{s}^{2}} \right\rfloor \left\lceil \frac{u(t)}{\mathsf{r}} \right\rfloor \mod q, \end{split}$$

where  $q \in \mathbb{N}$  has been chosen to cover the ranges of  $\{x(t), u(t), y(t)\}$ .

 $\rightarrow$  In fact, it is enough to cover the range of the output y(t) only.



<sup>1</sup>Kim, Shim, & Han, under review for TAC, arXiv:1912.07362


# Conclusion

Without use of bootstrapping and re-encryption,

# of multiplication by non-integers is limited for encrypted messages.



By conversion of the state matrix to integers, we have proposed that linear systems can be encrypted to run for an infinite time horizon.



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